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Why are the Glazers silent while Manchester United struggle?

The ownership structure lets them keep control without being the public face of it. ESPN reports that the family is nowhere to be seen. The argument here is that the people who hold the deciding votes should also be the ones who explain them.

Illustration for the Opinion article “Why are the Glazers silent while Manchester United struggle?”: an AI-generated editorial illustration showing an empty training ground at dawn with cones and markers laid out, with the headline set over it. Illustrative only, not a photograph of a real event.

Who actually owns Manchester United?

The Glazer family controls Manchester United. They bought the club through a leveraged buyout and later sold part of it on the New York Stock Exchange. The way the shares are arranged matters more than the names. The family holds a class of shares with far more votes per share than the class sold to public investors. That means their control has never depended on owning most of the club's economic value. Later, the INEOS group bought a minority stake and took over football operations, which created a second centre of influence. The source does not give current shareholding percentages, so none are stated here. What is clear is that ultimate control still sits with the family.

What does ESPN say is happening?

ESPN reports that the club is in crisis again and that the people with ultimate control cannot be seen. The report treats their absence as the story, and that is a fair point to raise. This article does not describe the club's results or the details of its current problems, because that information is not available here. The argument does not need it. Whatever set off this crisis, the question of who answers for a club in trouble is about structure. It comes back whichever manager, season or set of decisions is under scrutiny. The silence ESPN describes is a pattern, not a one-off.

Why would owners choose to stay out of sight?

There are sensible reasons. Owners who speak publicly have their words measured against results. A family that has faced long-running opposition from supporters gains little by stepping into that. Delegation also has an organisational logic. If a partner has been given control of football operations, comments from the owners could undercut the chain of command they agreed to. Many owners in football, especially investors based abroad, run their clubs at arm's length through boards and executives. None of this is unusual or improper in itself. The problem starts when distance becomes a way to separate power from consequences, so that the people with the deciding votes never have to explain how they use them.

How does the share structure shape accountability?

Two classes of shares let a founder or controlling family raise money from outside investors without giving up control. Technology companies often defend this as a way to protect a long-term vision. At a football club it works differently. Public shareholders can share in the club's finances, but their votes cannot realistically change what the board does. Supporters, most of whom are not shareholders at all, have even less leverage. The usual way shareholders hold management to account, by voting, is weakened on purpose. What remains is commercial, regulatory and reputational pressure. Reputational pressure only works if the owners choose to respond to it.

Why does the original takeover still matter?

The leveraged buyout is the main reason supporters' hostility has never faded. In this kind of deal, the buyer borrows money to pay for the purchase, and the club ends up carrying that debt rather than the buyer personally. For a football club, money that could pay for players, facilities or the stadium goes instead on repaying the loans that funded the takeover. The current amounts are not given here and should be checked in the club's own published accounts. The mechanism explains why supporters see every setback through the lens of ownership. It also explains why the owners might judge that appearing in public would only make that focus sharper.

What changed when a minority partner arrived?

The INEOS investment split the work between two parties. The new partner took responsibility for football operations, which made it the visible face of sporting decisions. In one way that makes things clearer: there is now a named party responsible for recruitment, coaching appointments and the training environment. In another way it distorts things. Criticism of football decisions naturally goes to whoever runs the football, while the family that keeps overall control can stay in the background. The arrangement lets the majority owner step away from the decisions most likely to cause anger without giving up control. That is the heart of the question ESPN raises.

Is silence from owners actually a problem?

In my view it is, though not because owners owe supporters a running commentary. Executives should do most of the talking. The problem is narrower. A club's strategic direction, its capital spending and how much debt it will carry are decisions for the owners, and they cannot be fully handed to someone else. When a club enters another period of turmoil, supporters reasonably want to know three things. Do the owners still back the current plan? Is more money coming? Is a sale being considered? A director of football cannot answer those questions. Silence leaves a gap that speculation fills, and speculation does lasting damage to any organisation trying to rebuild.

Can the Premier League or a regulator force them to engage?

Only to a limited extent. The Premier League runs an owners' and directors' test, which checks whether people are fit to own a club, not how often they talk to the public. England's new independent football regulator was set up by recent legislation. It is meant to focus on financial sustainability and to make clubs consult supporters on certain matters, such as the club's heritage. That gives fans a formal way to be heard, but it does not make owners speak publicly about a sporting crisis. How the regulator will use its powers in practice is still taking shape and is not known in detail here. Regulation can set a minimum level of accountability, but it cannot create visible leadership.

What would genuine accountability look like?

It would not need to be dramatic. The controlling owners could issue a regular statement setting out four things: their commitment to the club, their plans for investment, their approach to debt, and how they see the arrangement with their minority partner. That would go a long way. So would the owners attending organised supporter forums instead of leaving them entirely to executives. The principle is simple. Whoever holds the deciding votes should be ready to explain the broad direction those votes set. Most listed companies expect this of their boards. The case is stronger still at a club whose value depends so heavily on the loyalty of people who have no vote at all.

What is the wider lesson for football ownership?

Manchester United's situation is unusually visible, but the mechanism is common. Clubs are adopting more complicated ownership arrangements: minority partners, several classes of shares, and day-to-day control handed to others. That makes it easier for the people who really decide to stay out of sight in practice. When things go wrong, each layer can point to another. The argument here is that accountability should follow control: wherever real power sits, explanation should come from there too. That could happen through regulation, league rules or the owners' own choice. Either way, football would be better served if supporters could see who makes the decisions and hear from them directly when it matters most. A crisis is exactly when it matters.

Sources and further reading

  • ESPN: reporting on the current situation at Manchester United and the absence of its controlling owners
  • Manchester United plc annual reports and filings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission: share classes, voting rights and debt
  • Premier League handbook: the owners' and directors' test and rules on club ownership
  • UK government and parliamentary publications on the independent football regulator and its remit