One association's call cannot remove Fifa's president on its own

Key takeaways

• The BBC reports that the Football Association of Wales still holds the view that Gianni Infantino should step down as Fifa president, according to its chief executive, Noel Mooney.
• Fifa gives every member association one vote in its Congress, so the Welsh vote counts exactly as much as any other and no more.
• A Fifa president can change mid-term only through a resignation or a decision taken collectively by the member associations, never through pressure from one association alone.
• The Welsh position would matter more if other associations, a confederation or a nominated rival candidate turned the view into collective action.

The argument: a public position is not a lever

BBC Sport reports that Noel Mooney, chief executive of the Football Association of Wales, has said the association still believes Gianni Infantino should step down as president of Fifa. The report presents this as a renewal of an existing position rather than a new one. The full reasoning behind the Welsh stance is not part of the material summarised here, so this article does not try to reconstruct it.

The argument here is about structure, not motive. However strongly the view is held, a single national association has no mechanism to remove the president of world football's governing body. Fifa's constitution puts that power in its Congress, the assembly of all member associations. Inside that assembly, Wales is one voice among many. The FAW can repeat its position, put it on record and look for allies. It cannot turn the position into an outcome by itself.

This matters for readers who follow the World Cup, because the Fifa president presides over the body that runs the tournament. Fifa sets the qualifying framework, allocates places among the confederations, chooses hosts and controls the commercial rights. The question of who leads it is not abstract. But the way that leadership is chosen and removed makes public calls from individual associations a weak tool for immediate change. Their effect depends almost entirely on whether others take them up.

Evidence one: the one-member-one-vote Congress flattens influence

The first and strongest piece of evidence is how Fifa's Congress votes. Each member association has a single vote, whatever the size of its population, the strength of its league or its record in tournaments. A large footballing nation and a small island association weigh the same when the Congress decides.

This design was meant to make football's global governance inclusive, and it does give smaller nations a formal voice they would not have under a weighted system. It also means that no association, large or small, can dominate by itself. Wales sits in the European confederation, Uefa, alongside many other associations. Uefa is itself only one of six confederations whose members together make up the Congress. Even if every European association shared the Welsh view, they would still need significant support from other continents to command a majority.

In practice, then, a president's position depends on keeping broad support across confederations, not on avoiding criticism from any particular member. A president who keeps the backing of most associations across Africa, Asia, the Americas and Oceania can absorb sustained objections from parts of Europe. Under this voting arithmetic, the FAW's statement is a contribution to a debate. It is not a threat to a majority.

Evidence two: leadership changes run through elections and nominations

The second piece of evidence is the procedure itself. Fifa presidents are chosen at elective Congresses held on a fixed cycle, and the statutes limit how long one person may serve. To stand, a candidate must be nominated with the support of a minimum number of member associations. Between elections, a president leaves office early only by resigning or through a formal decision of the Congress, which needs a motion and a vote under the statutes.

Each step needs collective action. A rival candidate needs several associations to back a nomination. A motion against a sitting president needs a route onto the Congress agenda and then a majority to pass. A call from one association does none of these things. It is a public expression of opinion, and the statutes do not treat opinion as a procedural act.

Infantino has also, in the past, been returned to office without an opponent. That suggests the most basic precondition for change, an organised alternative, has not existed at recent elections. Until associations that share the Welsh view agree on a candidate and secure the nominations needed, the electoral route stays theoretical. Without such an alternative, a call to step down asks the incumbent to leave voluntarily, and nothing compels him to.

Evidence three: the incentives facing most member associations

The third piece of evidence concerns why most associations behave as they do. Fifa pays development funding to its members. Smaller and less wealthy associations often depend heavily on it for facilities, coaching programmes, women's football and administration. That funding is distributed centrally, and any administration can point to it as evidence of its record.

The World Cup also shapes these incentives. Decisions about how many teams qualify, how places are divided among confederations and where tournaments are held directly affect the ambitions of national teams. Associations whose countries have gained new routes to the finals, or expect to host, may judge that stable relations with the current leadership serve their football better than open confrontation.

None of this implies that associations act improperly. It means that many members have rational reasons to support continuity, and those reasons are not changed by one European association's statement. To persuade them, the FAW would need to show that a change of leadership would serve their interests too, which is a much harder task than restating a position.

The strongest case against: one voice can start a shift

The opposing case deserves a fair hearing, and it is stronger than it first looks.

First, governance changes rarely begin with a majority. They usually begin with a few voices willing to speak publicly while others stay quiet. By renewing its call rather than letting it lapse, the FAW signals that the position is not a passing reaction. Persistence can make it easier for other associations to say the same. A view repeated by a recognised member association carries more weight than anonymous criticism, and it helps define what counts as acceptable debate inside the organisation.

Second, the one-member-one-vote system does not mean European associations lack influence. A large share of the commercial value of international football, including broadcasting and sponsorship interest in the World Cup, is linked to European markets and clubs. Uefa is a powerful body in its own right. If dissent spread across European associations and Uefa took it up formally, it could raise the political and reputational cost of continuity in ways the voting count alone does not capture.

Third, a public call can affect behaviour without forcing anyone out. A leadership facing open criticism may change how it consults members, how transparent it is or how it takes decisions, to deny critics further ammunition. On this reading, the FAW's statement need not remove anyone to be effective. It needs only to change the conditions under which Fifa is governed.

These points are serious. They show that the Welsh position is not meaningless. They do not show that it can bring about the outcome it calls for. Each depends on other actors joining in, and that confirms rather than weakens the central argument: one association's call matters only to the extent that others adopt it.

What would change this conclusion

Several developments would weaken the argument that the Welsh call has little direct effect. None is currently known to have happened.

The clearest would be other member associations publicly adopting the same position, especially from outside Europe. Cross-confederation support is what the Congress arithmetic requires, so a broader coalition would turn a single view into a possible voting bloc.

A second would be a formal position from Uefa or another confederation. A confederation can coordinate its members, and it carries institutional weight that individual associations lack.

A third would be an organised alternative: a credible candidate able to secure the nominations needed under Fifa's statutes ahead of the next elective Congress. That would turn criticism into a real electoral choice.

A fourth would be a procedural move, such as a motion concerning the presidency reaching the agenda of a Fifa Congress. That would show the statutory route was being used rather than only discussed.

Finally, any change to Fifa's statutes affecting how presidents are elected, how long they serve or how they can be removed would alter the mechanism this argument rests on.

If any of these appeared, the FAW's renewed call might look like the opening move in a wider process. Without them, it remains a principled position stated on the record by one member of a large assembly.

Sources and further reading

• BBC Sport, report on the Football Association of Wales chief executive restating the association's view on the Fifa presidency
• Fifa Statutes, the governing document setting out the Congress, elections, nominations and presidential terms
• Uefa governance documents, for how the European confederation relates to its member associations and to Fifa
• Football Association of Wales official communications, for the association's own statements of its position