Fix a goalless attack the De Zerbi way, step by step

Assemble what you need before you change anything

This is a coaching and analysis problem, so start with the materials that let you diagnose rather than guess. You need footage of your own build-up phases cut by sequence, not by highlight; a pitch divided into the five vertical lanes De Zerbi's positional model uses; a clear written statement of the principles the players are being asked to follow; and training time, which is the scarcest resource of all during a congested fixture list.

You also need honesty about what is not known. The source material tells us only that no league goal has yet been scored. It does not tell us whether the side is failing to reach the penalty area, reaching it and shooting from poor positions, or arriving in good positions and not converting. Those are three different faults with three different remedies, and anyone who prescribes before separating them is guessing.

Separate creation from conversion first

A goal drought has an upstream cause and a downstream one. Upstream, a team may control the ball, move it comfortably in front of the opponent and never actually enter the box in a controlled way — territory without penetration. Downstream, a team may arrive repeatedly and shoot from angles and distances that rarely produce goals, or arrive in good positions and miss.

Only the first two are fully within a coach's control in the short term. Finishing itself is volatile and cannot be trained into a guarantee. So the correct first move is to count box entries and where shots are taken from, then decide which of the three faults you are fixing. Fixing the wrong one wastes weeks.

Start the sequence with the goalkeeper

De Zerbi's method, as developed at Sassuolo and Brighton, is built on deliberately inviting pressure. Defenders receive deep, often with the ball held still under the sole, and wait for an opponent to commit. The goalkeeper is treated as an outfield passer rather than a last resort, which means the team plays with one more body in the first phase than the opponent can press with.

The laws make this possible. At a goal kick the ball is in play as soon as it is kicked and clearly moves, and opponents must remain outside the penalty area until that moment. That single rule change is what turned the short goal kick from a novelty into a structural tool: it guarantees the building side a free first pass, and every subsequent pass is played against a press that is already stretched.

The cost is obvious. Losing the ball in that zone concedes a chance immediately, and the psychological weight of that risk grows when goals are not arriving at the other end. Players will only keep doing it if the reward is visible.

Attack the space the press leaves behind

Baiting is worthless without a rehearsed exit. The point of drawing three or four opponents towards your own box is that they are no longer between your midfielders and their goal. The reward pass must therefore be vertical and fast: into a midfielder who has found the blind side of the first pressing line, or clipped over it into a forward who lays it into a third runner arriving at speed.

Two mechanisms make this repeatable. The first is the third-man combination: player A passes to B, B's job is not to turn but to set the ball for C, who is already moving forward and can attack the space at full speed. The second is the free man. If the opponent presses with equal numbers, the goalkeeper's involvement creates a spare player somewhere; the whole team's job is to find where, rather than to force the ball into a crowd.

Fix the occupation of width and the half-spaces

Once the ball is out, scoring depends on how the pitch is occupied. The wingers must hold the touchline to pin the opposing full-backs; if the winger drifts inside early, the full-back tucks in and the defensive line becomes narrow and compact, which is exactly what a deep block wants. With width held, the half-spaces between full-back and centre-back become available to midfielders and an inside forward.

From there the pattern is to overload one side, drag the defensive block across, and then release the isolated winger on the far side against a defender with no cover. The switch only works if the far winger has stayed wide and stayed patient, and if the switch is played early enough for the opponent not to slide back in time.

Build the box entry, not just the final pass

Most sterile possession dies at the edge of the area. The remedy is to rehearse arrival rather than delivery. The cutback from the byline or the pocket beside the six-yard box is the most reliable pattern in this style, because it is played across a defence that is facing its own goal and towards attackers who are facing forward.

That requires at least three specific occupations, timed to the moment the ball is won on the flank rather than to the moment the cross is struck: a near-post runner to fix the first defender, a player attacking the penalty spot, and a player at the top of the area for the cut-back and the rebound. A fourth, at the back post, punishes anything that clears the crowd. If the team arrives with one forward and everyone else behind the ball, the pattern is being taught without the bodies to execute it.

Treat set-pieces as a separate scoring stream

Dead balls are largely independent of open-play form, which is why they are the fastest available fix for a side that is not scoring. A team that dominates territory naturally earns corners and free-kicks in advanced areas, and a low-block opponent concedes more of them. Rehearsed routines — blocking structures, near-post flick-ons, deliberate second-phase occupation of the edge of the box — can produce goals in a week, while a rebuilt open-play model takes months. They also relieve the pressure that makes players abandon the risky build-up.

Avoid the mistakes that keep possession sterile

The most common is treating possession as the objective rather than the means. The second is numerical: too many players committed to the first phase and too few in the penalty area at the end of it. The third is inconsistency — changing system every week under pressure, so players never learn the automatisms that make a positional model quick.

Two more are specific to this style. Baiting the press against an opponent who does not press achieves nothing; against a deep block, the problem is not escaping pressure but breaking a compact line, which needs different tools. And blaming finishing is usually a way of avoiding structural work: it is the one factor a coach cannot directly control, which makes it a convenient explanation and a poor plan.

Know when this approach is the wrong choice

A build-up model of this kind is a poor fit if the squad's strengths lie elsewhere — if the defenders are uncomfortable receiving under pressure, if the goalkeeper's distribution profile does not support it, or if the forwards are at their best running into space behind a high line rather than combining in tight areas. It is also a difficult choice mid-season for a coach with little training time between fixtures, because the risk is taken immediately while the reward arrives only once patterns are learned.

And it is the wrong choice when the club's tolerance for short-term volatility is lower than the model's learning curve, since the method guarantees occasional errors in dangerous zones. In that case a more conservative first phase, with territory gained through longer passes and pressure regained high up the pitch, will produce fewer goals conceded from build-up — at the cost of the control the model is designed to create.

Frequently asked questions

What is De Zerbi's build-up style actually trying to achieve?

It aims to remove opponents from between the ball and their goal. By building deliberately from the goalkeeper and inviting pressure, the team draws defenders forward, then plays through or over them with a rehearsed exit pass. Because the goalkeeper acts as an extra passer, the building side usually has one more player in that phase than the opponent can press with, which is where the advantage comes from.

Why does a team that dominates possession sometimes fail to score?

Possession measures how long a team holds the ball, not where. A side can circulate safely in front of a compact defence, never enter the penalty area in a controlled way, and finish the match having looked dominant. Goals come from box entries and the quality of positions shots are taken from, so the diagnosis must start there rather than with possession figures.

What is a cutback and why is it considered a high-value pass?

A cutback is a pass played backwards from near the byline or the space beside the six-yard box towards attackers arriving at the penalty spot or the edge of the area. It is valuable because defenders are facing their own goal and moving backwards while attackers are facing forward and moving onto the ball, which gives the shooter a clean sight of goal with defenders unable to turn in time.

Can set-piece coaching realistically fix a goal drought?

It can help faster than a rebuilt open-play model, because dead balls are rehearsed situations largely independent of match rhythm. A side that holds territory earns corners and advanced free-kicks, and structured routines convert some of them. It is not a full solution — set-piece output is not a substitute for creating chances in open play — but it buys time while the deeper structural work takes effect.

Sources and further reading

• BBC Sport, for the report that Tottenham had not yet scored a Premier League goal this season
• The IFAB Laws of the Game, for the goal kick law that permits the ball to be played inside the penalty area
• Premier League competition rules and fixture scheduling documents, for the training-time constraints of a congested calendar
• Published coaching literature on positional play, for definitions of the five-lane structure, third-man combinations and half-space occupation