Fifa's one-nation-one-vote system makes Infantino hard to unseat

Key takeaways

• Fifa's president is elected by the member associations at Congress, and each association has one vote regardless of its size or footballing strength.
• The BBC reports that the chances of Gianni Infantino being removed look slim, little more than two months after news broke of his Fifa Forward Enterprise proposal.
• Most member associations rely on Fifa development money, which gives them a structural reason to back the administration that distributes it.
• A challenger must clear nomination and eligibility hurdles before campaigning starts, so opposition has to organise early or it never reaches the ballot.

Fifa's electoral structure strongly favours the sitting president

The question is not whether Infantino has critics. He clearly does. The question is whether the system Fifa uses to choose its president gives those critics a realistic way to win. On the evidence available, it does not.

Fifa is run as a federation of national associations. Clubs, leagues, players, broadcasters and supporters have no formal vote. The presidency is decided at the Fifa Congress, where each member association casts one ballot. A small island association counts for exactly as much as one of the biggest footballing nations in Europe or South America. The equal weighting was meant to make the organisation democratic in a global sense, and it does. It also means the president answers mainly to the many smaller and mid-sized associations, not to the handful of large football economies where criticism of Fifa is usually loudest.

According to the BBC, little more than two months have passed since news broke of Infantino's Fifa Forward Enterprise proposal, and the chances of him being removed as president appear slim. This article does not have the full details of that proposal, and they are not set out here. What can be explained is why the electoral mechanism makes removal so difficult, whatever view one takes of the proposal itself.

The argument has three parts. Development funding links the electorate's interests to the incumbent. The nomination and eligibility process screens out challengers early. Voting in confederation blocs means a challenger has to win over whole regions, not individual associations.

One vote per association rewards whoever controls development funding

Fifa's main source of income is the men's World Cup, mostly through broadcasting and commercial rights. A large share of that money goes back to member associations through the Fifa Forward development programme. It pays for pitches, headquarters, coaching education, competitions and running costs.

For a wealthy European federation with large domestic broadcasting deals, Fifa money is welcome but not essential. For many associations in Africa, Asia, Oceania, the Caribbean and Central America it is a central part of the budget. Some would struggle to run their national teams and domestic competitions without it.

This creates a clear incentive. The associations that depend most on central funding together make up a large part of the electorate, because every association has one vote however small its budget. A president who has kept or increased those distributions can present the record as a direct benefit to most voters. A challenger has to persuade those same voters that change would not put that income at risk. Promises of reform are hard to sell when the existing arrangement is paying for running costs.

Expanding the men's World Cup to 48 teams strengthens the same dynamic. More places spread across the confederations means more associations have a realistic route to the finals, along with the prize money, attention and commercial value that come with qualifying. Supporters of the format present it as globalising the game. Whatever its sporting merits, it gives many voting members another concrete reason to see the current leadership as having served them.

None of this involves impropriety. Redistributing revenue to poorer members is one of the stated purposes of a global federation. The point is mechanical. When the person seeking re-election oversees the main source of funding for most of the electorate, the incumbent starts with a structural advantage that a challenger cannot match from outside.

The nomination and eligibility rules filter challengers early

Under Fifa's statutes, nobody can simply declare themselves a candidate for president. A prospective candidate needs formal nominations from member associations, and the statutes set a minimum number. They must also pass an eligibility and integrity check run by an independent review committee before being accepted onto the ballot.

These safeguards have a sound purpose. They are meant to keep unserious or unsuitable candidates off the ballot and to protect the election from people with conflicts of interest. They also mean that opposition has to form early. A would-be challenger must persuade several associations to put their names forward in public, often well before the campaign properly begins. An association that nominates a rival takes a visible risk if the incumbent then wins comfortably. Many associations find it more sensible to wait.

The voting rules add a further hurdle. The statutes require a two-thirds majority of valid votes to win in the first round, and a simple majority in later rounds. In principle, a well-organised opposition could force a second round by denying the incumbent two-thirds. But that requires a candidate on the ballot and a bloc willing to vote openly against the sitting president. Without both, the threshold does not come into play. When a president stands unopposed, the vote is in effect a confirmation.

There is also the question of term limits. Fifa introduced limits on how long a president may serve as part of its governance reforms. How earlier periods of office count towards those limits is a question for Fifa's own rules and the bodies that interpret them. This article does not attempt to settle it. The relevant point is that any eligibility question would be decided inside Fifa's structures, not by outside critics.

Confederation blocs tend to move together

In practice, member associations do not vote as 211 separate actors. They belong to six continental confederations: UEFA in Europe, CONMEBOL in South America, CONCACAF in North and Central America and the Caribbean, CAF in Africa, the AFC in Asia and the OFC in Oceania. Each confederation has its own leadership and its own seats on the Fifa Council, and its own interest in how tournaments, places and money are shared out.

Confederations often take a collective line before a presidential election. Their leaders announce support for a candidate, and member associations generally follow. A challenger therefore cannot win by gathering scattered individual votes. They need to break the position of whole confederations, or at least split them.

That is a demanding task. Confederation leaders sit on the Fifa Council alongside the president and help shape decisions on competitions and funding. Their influence depends partly on good working relations with Fifa's leadership. Unless a confederation has a strong reason to break ranks, such as a dispute over a specific policy, its natural position is to stay with the incumbent.

Europe is the confederation most often linked with criticism of Fifa, and UEFA has disagreed with Fifa's leadership on several issues over the years. But UEFA's members are only one part of a global electorate. Even a fully united European bloc could not change the outcome alone. Opposition from Europe only becomes decisive if it is joined by significant support from at least one other large confederation.

Opposition has a real basis even if it lacks the votes

The strongest case against this conclusion runs as follows. Fifa elections have not always gone as expected, and the conditions that keep an incumbent safe can change quickly.

First, presidencies have ended suddenly before. Infantino's predecessor, Sepp Blatter, resigned soon after winning re-election, and the organisation then held an open contest. A structure that looks fixed for years can be reopened by events outside the electoral calendar.

Second, the Fifa Forward Enterprise proposal could itself become the point around which opposition forms. The BBC's reporting shows the proposal has attracted enough attention to raise the question of the presidency. If member associations conclude that it changes how development money is generated, controlled or distributed in ways they dislike, the funding advantage described above could turn into a weakness. A funding system that wins loyalty can lose it if associations come to believe it threatens their share. How the proposal would work in detail, and how associations have responded in private, is not known here.

Third, the stakeholders without votes still have influence. Leagues, clubs, player unions and broadcasters cannot vote at Congress, but they shape the economics of football. Sustained pressure from them can affect the confederations that do vote, especially in Europe. Disputes over the international calendar, player workload and the expansion of club competitions have already put those groups at odds with Fifa at times.

Finally, the two-thirds threshold in the first round does give an organised minority real power. A coalition that falls well short of a majority could still stop an incumbent from winning outright. That could force negotiations or raise the cost of victory. Opposition does not need to win to matter.

These points are serious. They show that the presidency is not beyond challenge in principle. What they do not yet show is a mechanism by which a challenge would succeed. That would take a named candidate, nominations, and confederations willing to break ranks, and on present reporting none of these is in place.

What evidence would change the conclusion

Several developments would weaken the case that Infantino is very unlikely to be removed.

The clearest would be a credible candidate who has secured the required nominations and passed the eligibility review. Until someone does that, opposition stays a matter of commentary, not a choice on the ballot.

A second would be a confederation outside Europe publicly withdrawing support or declining to endorse the incumbent. Because voting happens in blocs, one large confederation changing position would matter more than many individual statements of concern.

A third would be clear evidence that the Fifa Forward Enterprise proposal is unpopular with the associations that depend most on development funding. If the people who benefit most from the current arrangement came to see the proposal as a threat, the main structural advantage described in this article would be under real strain.

A fourth would be a formal ruling from Fifa's own bodies on any eligibility or term-limit question that went against the incumbent. That would change the position immediately, whatever the voting maths.

Without any of these, the most reasonable reading of the mechanism matches the BBC's assessment. Removal looks unlikely, because Fifa's electoral system is designed in a way that makes incumbents hard to dislodge.

Sources and further reading

• BBC Sport: reporting on the Fifa Forward Enterprise proposal and the prospects for the Fifa presidency.
• Fifa Statutes: the organisation's governing document, setting out Congress procedures, candidacy requirements and voting thresholds.
• Fifa Forward development programme documentation: Fifa's published material on how development funding is distributed to member associations.
• Continental confederation governance documents: statutes and Council membership rules for UEFA, CONMEBOL, CONCACAF, CAF, AFC and OFC.